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The ability to infer others’ thoughts and emotions is a skill which is essential for 
appropriate everyday social interaction.  Researchers have argued that this 
ability may be deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) which could explain 
many of their socio-communicative difficulties.  The literature exploring emotion 
processing in ASD has reported mixed findings, with more consistent difficulties 
being found with complex, dynamic stimuli that mimic the demands of everyday 
life.  
This study used a novel method to investigate how adults with ASD process 
spontaneous emotions elicited during real-life social situations.  Participants with 
and without autism watched videos of individuals receiving gifts which varied in 
level of appropriateness (i.e. chocolate, monopoly money, or a home-made 
novelty). Individuals were asked to 1) guess which gift the participant had 
received based on his or her reaction and 2) state the emotion they thought the 
individual was expressing upon receiving the gift. Eye movements were also 
measured while participants watched the videos.  The results showed that 
individuals with ASD had particular difficulty inferring when someone had 
received chocolate or the home-made gift, suggesting problems with 
distinguishing between genuine and feigned happy emotional responses.  Eye-
tracking results showed that although individuals with ASD looked slightly less to 
the eye region, this did not explain their difficulty interpreting these particular 
emotion expressions. Overall, these findings provide evidence of processing 
differences when inferring spontaneous emotion and situational antecedents of 
behaviour with real-life stimuli.  
 





Can adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) infer what happened to 
someone from their emotional response?  Millikan has argued that in everyday 
life others’ emotions are most commonly used to work out the antecedents of 
behaviour, an ability termed retrodictive mindreading.  As those with ASD show 
difficulties interpreting others’ emotions, we predicted that these individuals 
would have difficulty with retrodictive mindreading.  Sixteen adults with high 
functioning autism or Aspergers Syndrome and 19 typically developing adults 
viewed 21 video clips of people reacting to one of three gifts (chocolate, 
monopoly money or a home-made novelty) and then inferred what gift the 
recipient received and the emotion expressed by that person. Participants’ eye 
movements were recorded while they viewed the videos.  Results showed that 
participants with ASD were only less accurate when inferring who received a 
chocolate or home-made gift.  This difficulty was not due to lack of 
understanding what emotions were appropriate in response to each gift, as both 
groups gave consistent gift and emotion inferences significantly above chance 
(genuine positive for chocolate and feigned positive for home-made).  Those 
with ASD did not look significantly less to the eyes of faces in the videos, and 
looking to the eyes did not correlate with accuracy on the task.  These results 
suggest that those with ASD are less accurate when retrodicting events involving 
recognition of genuine and feigned positive emotions, and challenge claims that 
lack of attention to the eyes causes emotion recognition difficulties in ASD. 
Keywords: Autism, Retrodictive Mindreading, Eye Tracking, Spontaneous 
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 Successfully interpreting others’ emotional responses is key for successful 
social interaction.  It is widely reported that individuals with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD), who experience profound difficulties with social interaction 
(Wing and Gould, 1989), also experience difficulties in emotion recognition.  
Indeed, Kanner (1943) originally described autism as a disorder of ‘affective 
contact’, and difficulties with processing emotion are part of the current 
diagnostic criteria for autism (APA, 2000).  However, studies of emotion 
processing in ASD have shown highly inconsistent results; some finding 
differences in emotion recognition and others failing to find differences between 
individuals with and without ASD.  This is particularly the case for adults with 
ASD who have average intelligence, who tend to pass simpler emotion 
recognition tasks using static, posed expressions (see Uljarevic and Hamilton, 
2013; Gaigg, 2012; Harms, Martin and Wallace, 2010). To resolve this debate, 
and assess the subtle difficulties adults with ASD exhibit, we need to develop 
tasks that match the demands of everyday life, while maintaining experimental 
control.  This is the purpose of the current study.  
 As stated above, studies using a recognition paradigm with basic emotions 
(e.g. happy, sad, angry) often report ceiling effects or fail to find differences 
between individuals with and without ASD (see Adolphs et al., 2001; Loveland et 
al., 2008; Neumann et al., 2006; Ogai et al., 2003; Rutherford and Towns, 
2008; Spezio et al., 2007a,b).  In contrast, emotion recognition research which 
has used either more complex emotions (e.g. guilt), dynamic stimuli, or 
emotions with lower intensity tend to reveal impairments in adults with ASD 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen et al. 2001a; Philip et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2007; 
Roeyers et al., 2001; Golan et al.,  2006).  These results suggest that stimuli 




which more closely reflect the demands of everyday processing are more likely 
to reveal differences between adults with and without ASD.   
 However there are reasons to question whether these more naturalistic 
tasks mirror the demands of everyday life.  For example these previous studies, 
(with the exception of Roeyers et al., 2001), used posed, rather than 
spontaneous expressions. Spontaneous expressions differ to posed expressions 
as they are not produced by a direct request by another person (Matsumoto et 
al., 2009), but rather occur naturally during social interaction.  Thus, 
spontaneous expressions have lower signal clarity; they are far more subtle  
than posed expressions, can portray more than one emotion and be subject to 
display rules, such as trying to portray a positive, rather than a negative 
reaction to a social interaction partner (Matsumoto et al., 2009; Carroll and 
Russell, 1997; O’Sullivan, 1982).  This may explain why studies have found 
spontaneous expressions to be harder to recognize than posed expressions 
(Hess and Blairy 2001; Naab and Russell 2007; Wagner et al., 1992; Wagner, 
MacDonald and Manstead, 1986; Wagner, 1990).  Thus, the stimuli 
predominantly used in previous studies may not share the characteristics of 
emotion expressions encountered in everyday life, which are more subtle and 
challenging to interpret.  This may help explain the inconsistent results of 
previous research exploring emotion recognition, particularly in the case of 
adults with ASD. 
Another reason to question whether previous emotion recognition tasks 
mirror the demands of everyday life is the predominant focus on recognition. 
Millikan (2005) has argued that the most common form of emotion recognition is 
not inferring another’s emotion (as in the tasks described above), rather we 
more typically observe a person’s emotional response, and then go about 




explaining this response after the event (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; 
Robinson & Mitchell, 1995).  This ability has been termed retrodictive 
mindreading (Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Millikan, 2005; Gallese and Goldman, 
1998).   
The only previous study of retrodictive mindreading was recently 
performed by Pillai, Sheppard and Mitchell (2012), who demonstrated that 
typically developing adults could systematically infer what happened to someone 
from watching a brief video clip of their response (whether the individual was 
told a story, a joke, was left waiting or received a compliment).  However Pillai 
et al’s study did not include any measure of emotion inference.  As those with 
ASD may have difficulty understanding what behaviours are appropriate in 
certain social situations (Loveland et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), in the 
current study, we record participants’ estimations of the target’s emotion, in 
addition to the situational inference. This is to explore whether those with ASD 
and typical controls understand what emotional responses are appropriate to the 
given range of social situations.  This allows us to determine whether difficulty 
retrodicting the correct situational antecedent is due to impaired recognition of 
emotion as opposed to understanding what kind of reaction would be 
appropriate in a given social situation (such as being polite when receiving an 
unwanted gift).  
In contrast to Pillai et al’s (2012) study, we investigate a different, but 
commonly experienced social situation – receiving a gift.  This social situation 
was chosen as it provides the opportunity to investigate adults with ASD’s 
understanding and recognition of more complex emotions.  For example ‘social 
emotions’ expressed in the presence of another person, such as feigning a 
positive response in order to be polite (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Kasari, 




Chamberlain and Bauminger, 2001) or ‘cognitive emotions’, which involve 
understanding of belief, such as surprise (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-Cohen, 
Spitz and Cross, 1993). We investigate whether adults with ASD can understand 
that a person may pretend to like a handmade novelty, be confused on receiving 
an unwelcome gift such as monopoly money, and be genuinely positive on 
receiving a welcome gift such as chocolate.  Can participants with ASD 
successfully gauge these spontaneous emotional responses, in order to retrodict 
what gift a person received?  
The benefit of this retrodictive mindreading task is that spontaneous 
emotion recognition and understanding can be assessed, while having an 
objectively correct answer (the situation that caused the response).  Typically 
developing individuals can systematically retrodict what situation caused a 
reaction from a brief video clip of the response (Pillai et al., 2012).Thus it 
appears that spontaneous emotional responses provide information which 
typically developing adults can reliably recognize, in order to infer the 
anteceding situations that produce them (Matsumoto and Willingham, 2006; 
Matsumoto et al., 2009).  Given that adults with ASD have difficulty interpreting 
complex emotions, we predicted that they would have difficulty interpreting such 
spontaneous emotional responses and thus exhibit difficulties with retrodictive 
mindreading. 
We also explore the eye movements of participants, in order to investigate 
whether, as has been proposed by previous research, people with autism have 
difficulty inferring emotions from the eye region of faces (e.g. Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1997; 2001). Studies of adults with ASD have not always shown overall 
differences in visual attention to social information, such as the eyes (e.g. 
Hernandez et al., 2009; Rutherford and Towns, 2008), but rather first fixation, 




suggesting a delay in looking to socially pertinent information, rather than an 
absence (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2008; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2009; Freeth, et 
al., 2010a,b).  This delay in looking to pertinent social cues could particularly 
impact on processing of fast paced dynamic stimuli (Klin et al., 2002; Speer et 
al., 2007).  Thus our task, which presents dynamic and complex facial 
expressions, investigates whether adults with ASD find retrodictive mindreading 
difficult due to lack of attention to pertinent social information, in particular the 
eye region of faces. 
 
Method 
 Participants. The ASD group comprised 16 adults (6 female, 10 male) 
aged 20-61 years, recruited from adverts in local media, the National Autistic 
Society and through various autism support groups across the UK. All the 
participants with ASD had been formally diagnosed by a clinician according to 
DSM-IV criteria (American Psychological Association, 1994).  Diagnosis was 
independently confirmed by the researchers through the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS, Lord et al., 1999) and Autism Quotient (AQ, 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b).  All participants met the criteria for ASD on the 
ADOS and/or the AQ.  The typical group comprised 19 adults (7 female, 12 
male) aged 17-67 years, recruited from Nottingham University campus and the 
general population through adverts to local media.   
 The full Weschler Abbreviated Subscales of Intelligence (WASI-III, 
Weschler, 1999) was administered to all participants. Groups were matched on 
gender, age, full scale, verbal and performance IQ (see table 1 below for 
participant characteristics and group comparisons).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 





Materials.  Twenty-one video clips (ranging from 1.3 to 6 seconds in 
duration) were selected as stimuli.  The videos were presented on the Tobii 
(1750) eye-tracker in high definition (1920 X 1080i).  Eye movements were 
recorded using Clearview software at a rate of 50 recordings per second. 
Stimuli Development.  Stimulus videos were collected from 44 University 
students who had volunteered to take part in an unrelated study.  After 
approximately one hour of testing, each individual was paid their inconvenience 
allowance of £12 and asked if they would be willing to continue for a few more 
minutes by being filmed for a study investigating communication.  
Participants sat in a comfortable chair and were filmed from two feet using 
a Sony HD Camcorder, while reading aloud a list of five randomly selected 
neutral words.  Immediately after, the experimenter pretended to turn off the 
video camera, and thanked the person for staying behind. The experimenter 
then offered a reward, which was either a box of high quality chocolates (N=9), 
a poor quality handmade gift (N=17) or a wad of monopoly money (N=18).  
Unknown to the recipient, their ensuing reaction to the gift was filmed and 
subsequently their consent was obtained for using the video in psychology 
experiments.   
Twenty-one videos were selected for use in the current experiment 
according to certain criteria: face remained in full view of the camera, there was 
a noticeable reaction, and the recipient did not say what the gift was.  Twenty-
seven videos did not meet these criteria leaving twenty-one videos (seven 
different people receiving chocolate, seven receiving Monopoly money and seven 
receiving a handmade gift).   




These twenty-one videos were edited using final cut pro 4 to provide a 
short clip of each person’s reaction to the gift: in most cases, neutral to the peak 
of their reaction and back to neutral again.  If the recipient did not return to a 
neutral expression the clip consisted of the peak of their expression held for a 
few seconds.  Given that the expressions were not contrived, the duration of the 
video clips varied somewhat, from 1.3 seconds to 6 seconds (mean chocolate = 
2.99 (SD=.98), mean home-made = 3.63 (SD=1.17), mean monopoly money = 
3.73 (SD=1.18)).  A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference in the 
mean length of the video clips for each gift (F(2,18)=.91, p=.42). 
Procedure. Participants were given an information sheet about the study 
and asked to give their consent to take part.  Participants sat approximately 40 
cm’s from the eye-tracking screen.  A six-point calibration was conducted before 
the start of the experiment and participants were asked to remain as still as 
possible throughout the experiment to prevent any deterioration in calibration.  
Participants were told that they would see 21 video-taped reactions of 
people receiving either a box of chocolates, a wad of monopoly money or a 
hand-made gift in exchange for doing a big favour for someone.  They were 
asked to watch each video carefully and; 1) judge what gift the target had been 
offered (out of the three options), 2) estimate the emotion of the target on being 
offered the gift.  All responses were verbal and digitally recorded. 
The researcher was present to monitor the experiment and was not blind 
to the emotion viewed by the participant. Each trial presentation sequence 
consisted of a 500 millisecond blank screen preceding a video clip of a person 
reacting to getting a gift followed by another blank screen.  The researcher 
would then ask the participant ‘do you think the person in the video got a box of 
chocolates, a tacky glitter card made especially for them, or some fake money?’  




The participant was given as much time as they needed to respond to the test 
question.  After giving a response the participant was then asked ‘How do you 
think the person felt when they got the [participant’s gift response]?’  After the 
participant had responded to both of the test questions, the researcher asked if 
the participant was ready for the next video and started the next trial by a key 
press.  Participants were debriefed and paid £5 for their time.  Ethical approval 
for the study was granted by the University of Nottingham, School of Psychology 
Ethics Committee. 
Emotion description coding.  As participants’ estimations of the target’s 
emotion were free response, in order to analyse these data a coding scheme was 
developed which adequately captured the range of emotion labels participants 
used.  Participants’ estimations of the recipient’s emotion were coded as 
belonging to one of four valence categories: 
Positive: Any label which had the connotation of being positive. For 
example, happy, glad, pleasantly surprised, pleased. 
Negative: Any label which had a negative connotation.  For example, 
displeased, unhappy, disappointed, angry, upset.   
Pretend: Any label which referred to the participant concealing negative 
emotions.  For example, hiding disappointment, fake smile, politely accepting. 
Confused: Any label which did not have a positive or negative 
connotation.  For example, surprised, confused, puzzled, thoughtful. 
 Inter-rater agreement: Inter-rater agreement for the above coding 
scheme was established in the current experiment for the typical and ASD 
group’s emotion ratings.  These emotion ratings were coded by the 
experimenter, along with two independent raters blind to methods and 
hypotheses.  Cohen’s Kappa was used to establish inter-rater agreement when 




using the above coding scheme to code participants' estimations of emotion.  
Inter-rater agreement was K=.76 for typical participants responses and K=.79 
for the ASD group’s emotion responses.  In the current study, participants’ 





INSERT TABLE 2 and FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Are those with ASD less accurate than typical controls when inferring gift? 
 Table 2 shows the confusion matrices for participants’ gift inferences in 
the typical control (a) and ASD (b) groups.   The typical control group gave more 
correct than incorrect gift responses.  However those with ASD only gave more 
correct than incorrect gift responses when inferring who received monopoly 
money. 
 To control for response bias (e.g. more don’t know responses in the ASD 
group), the proportion of correct gift responses were calculated as the number of 
correct responses, divided by the total number of times a participant offered that 
gift response (figure 1). 
A two way mixed ANOVA was conducted with group as a between subjects 
factor with two levels (ASD, typical control) and percentage of correct gift 
inferences as a within subjects factor with three levels (chocolate, home-made 
and monopoly money).  Results showed a significant main effect of gift 
(F(2,66)=16.65, p<.001); significantly more correct home-made gifts were 
inferred than chocolate (F(1,33)=8.65, p<.01), and significantly more correct 
monopoly money gifts were inferred than chocolate and home-made 




(F(1,33)=21.97, p<0.001). There was a significant interaction between group 
and gift (F(2,66)=3.35, p<.05); those with ASD were significantly less accurate 
than controls when inferring who received a chocolate or home-made gift, but 
not monopoly money (F(1,33)=4.2, p<.05).  There was also a significant main 
effect of group; those with ASD made significantly less correct gift inferences 
than the typical control group overall (ASD mean = 45.8%, Typical mean = 
54.45%, F(1,33)=4.42, p<.05). 
 
What was the pattern of participants’ errors? 
The raw frequencies in table 2 show that both groups tend to confuse 
reactions to home-made gifts with chocolate more than monopoly money.  
These confusions between chocolate and home-made responses are more 
pronounced in the ASD group. To compare this pattern of errors between 
groups, a three way mixed ANOVA was conducted with group as a between 
subjects factor with two levels (ASD, typical), correct answer (i.e. what gift the 
target received) as a within subjects factor with three levels (chocolate, home-
made and monopoly money) and participants’ response as a within subjects 
factor with three levels (chocolate, home-made and monopoly money).  
The three way mixed ANOVA showed a significant three way interaction 
between group, correct answer and participants gift response (F(4,132)=3.5, 
p<.01).  Simple main effects analysis showed no significant difference between 
correct and incorrect gift responses when participants with ASD inferred who 
received a chocolate gift (F(2,32)=2.1, p=.14).  There was a significant 
difference between correct and incorrect gift responses when participants with 
ASD inferred who received a home-made gift (F(2,32)=28.64, p<0.001) and 
monopoly money (F(2,32)=31.72, p<0.001). Bonferroni corrected t-tests 




showed no significant difference between correct home-made and incorrect 
chocolate inferences (p=1), but significantly more correct home-made gift than 
incorrect monopoly money inferences (p<.001) and significantly more correct 
monopoly money than incorrect chocolate (p<0.001) and home-made gift 
inferences (p<.001). 
Simple main effects analysis showed a significant difference between 
correct and incorrect gift responses when typical controls inferred who received 
chocolate (F(2,32)=7.29, p<0.01), a home-made gift (F(2,32)=35.05, p<0.001) 
or monopoly money (F(2,32)=31.72, p<0.001).  Bonferroni corrected t-tests 
showed that typical controls were significantly more likely to give a correct 
chocolate response than an incorrect home-made (p<.01) or monopoly money 
response (p<.05); give a correct home-made response than an incorrect 
chocolate (p<.05) or monopoly money response (p<.001); and give a correct 
monopoly money response than an incorrect chocolate (p<.001) or home-made 
response (p<.001). 
Neither proportion of correct chocolate (r=.02, p=.9; r=.02, p=.9), home-
made (r=.0.1, p=.7; r=.0.3, p=.2), or monopoly money responses (r=.02, 
p=.9; r=.1, p=.6) correlated with full scale IQ or AQ scores respectively in the 
ASD group. 
 
Are gift and emotion inferences consistent in both groups? 
Tables 3 and 4 show the observed and expected frequencies of emotion 
labels participants offered alongside their gift inference for correct (3) and 
incorrect (4) trials (e.g. observed and expected frequency of positive emotion 




ratings for correct (3) and incorrect (4) chocolate responses)1. If those with ASD 
were less accurate when inferring who received a chocolate or home-made gift 
because they did not understand which emotions were appropriate in response 
to these gifts, then emotion and gift inferences would not be consistent in each 
group.  In table 3, values with subscript A denote correct gift inferences with 
consistent emotion labels, and in table 4 values with lower case subscript a 
denote incorrect gift inferences with consistent emotion labels (i.e. positive for 
chocolate, pretend for home-made and confused for monopoly money).  
For correct trials, both typical controls (3a) and those with ASD (3b) rate 
reactions to chocolate as predominantly positive and monopoly money as 
predominantly confused.  The observed frequencies are also far higher than 
expected, whereas inconsistent gift and emotion responses (e.g. positive for 
monopoly money) are far lower than expected.  Although pretend emotion 
ratings were rare, both groups almost exclusively ascribe this rating to home-
made gift inferences and above the level expected.  This pattern is also evident 
for incorrect trials in the typical control (4a) and ASD (4b) groups, although both 
groups rate home-made responses as less positive (below expected) and more 
confused (above expected).  
To explore whether participants in both groups tended to attribute similar 
emotions to each gift, regardless of whether the gift inferred was correct or 
incorrect, likelihood ratios were calculated from the observed frequencies in 
tables 3 and 4 for each group.  The likelihood ratio is a chi-square statistic with 
the same distribution and degrees of freedom as Pearson’s chi-square.  It is 
based on maximum likelihood theory, where a model is created from the total 
                                                          
1 Please see supplementary data tables 5 and 6 for a full breakdown of gift and emotion 
response combinations for correct and incorrect trials in the ASD and typical control 
group. 




observed frequency of consistent (cells denoted by A for correct and  a for 
incorrect gift responses) and total observed frequency of inconsistent gift and 
emotion responses, where the probability of obtaining these data is maximized, 
then compared to the probability of obtaining these data under the null 
hypothesis.  The resulting statistic is therefore based on comparing the observed 
frequency of consistent and inconsistent gift and emotion responses with those 
predicted by the model.   
Results showed that both groups gave significantly more consistent and 
less inconsistent gift and emotion inferences than predicted by the model, when 
the gift inferred was correct (Typical group, observed consistent=108, expected 
consistent=59.9, observed inconsistent=85, expected inconsistent=122.5, 
Lχ²(1)=17.8, p<0.001; ASD group, observed consistent=81, expected 
consistent=36.2,  observed inconsistent=76, expected inconsistent=82.4, 
Lχ²(1)=26, p<0.001) or incorrect (Typical group observed consistent=90, 
expected consistent=49.4, observed inconsistent=76, expected 
inconsistent=137.2, Lχ²(1)=6.3, p<0.05; ASD group observed consistent=92, 
expected consistent=46.8, observed inconsistent=104, expected 
inconsistent=149.1, Lχ²(1)=21.3, p<0.001). 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE 
Eye Tracking Results. 
Analysis 
 Regions of interest were defined using the Eye Tracker Output Utility 
(Van-Heuven, 2010) over a series of static pictures, representing the movement 
of the target over the course of the video. The Eye tracker Output Utility (Van-
Heuven, 2010) calculated the number and duration of fixations in each area of 




interest (figure 2).  Percentage number and duration of fixations were calculated 
as the number/duration of fixations in the region of interest divided by the total 
number of fixations/total duration of the video. These percentages were used in 
analyses to control for differences in stimulus duration and number of fixations 
between participants. On perusal of the raw eye tracking data, it became 
apparent that loss of calibration (indicated by an error message that a majority 
of fixations were being made outside the area of the screen) occurred for one 
participant with ASD and six typical controls.  These data were excluded from 
analysis. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Do participants with ASD look less to the eyes? 
 A three way ANOVA compared ROI (eyes, mouth) for each gift (chocolate, 
home-made and monopoly money) in each group (ASD, typical control).  The 
three way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between gift and ROI for 
proportion of fixations (F(2, 52)=12, p<0.001) and fixation duration (F(2, 
52)=8.3, p<0.01), indicating that participants tended to look at the eyes and 
mouth differently depending on which gift response was viewed. Orthogonal 
contrasts showed that the proportion of fixations (F(1,26)=.02, p=.9), and 
fixation duration (F(1,26)=.001, p=.9) to the eyes and mouth were similar when 
viewing reactions to chocolate and home-made gifts. However when participants 
viewed reactions to monopoly money, the proportion of fixations (F(1,26)=28, 
p=.001) and fixation duration (F(1,26)=17.3, p=.001) to the eyes and mouth 
were significantly different compared to when viewing reactions to chocolate and 
home-made gifts; participants tended to look more to the mouth than the eyes 
when viewing reactions to chocolate and home-made and more to the eyes than 
the mouth when viewing reactions to monopoly money (Figures 3 and 4).  




INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE 
Although participants with ASD looked longer to the mouth than the eyes 
compared to typical controls, this interaction was not significant for proportion of 
fixations (F(1,26)=3.7, p=.07) or fixation duration (F(1,26)=2.9, p=.1) (figures 
5 and 6).  There were no significant correlations between proportion of fixation 
or fixation duration to the eyes or mouth and correct gift responses when 
viewing the chocolate, home-made or monopoly money responses in the ASD or 
typical group.     
INSERT FIGURES 5 AND 6 HERE 
Discussion 
This study aimed to develop a new naturalistic emotion recognition task to 
assess the subtle emotion recognition difficulties adults with ASD experience in 
everyday life.  Can adults with ASD successfully infer what happened to 
someone from their emotional response?  Adults with ASD were not less 
accurate than typical controls when inferring who received monopoly money 
from a brief video clip of a person’s emotional response.  However those with 
ASD were significantly less accurate when inferring who received a chocolate or 
home-made gift. This difficulty was not isolated to a subset of the ASD sample, 
as neither IQ nor a measure of self-reported autistic traits correlated with 
accuracy.   
Problems inferring who received a chocolate or home-made gift could be 
due to difficulties with recognizing these emotions or failing to understand which 
emotions were appropriate when receiving these gifts.  As both groups made 
consistent gift and emotion inferences significantly above chance, the findings 
suggest that adults with ASD understood which emotions were appropriate in 
response to each gift; positive for chocolate, confused for monopoly money and 




pretend for home-made.  Thus, reduced accuracy when inferring who received a 
home-made or chocolate gift was most likely due to difficulty recognizing 
positive and feigned positive emotions. However adults with ASD could 
successfully recognize who was confused, and thus correctly recognized who 
received monopoly money. 
Understanding which emotions and behaviours are appropriate in different 
social situations has rarely been studied in ASD, and never before in adults with 
ASD.  Children with ASD fail to identify which behaviours are inappropriate in a 
range of social situations (Loveland et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), and 
have difficulty understanding what situation will cause a complex emotion such 
as surprise (e.g. Jane will be surprised on opening the empty box of coco pops), 
but not situations which cause basic emotions such as happiness and sadness 
(e.g. having a birthday party as opposed to grazing a knee) (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1993).  In the current study adults with ASD understood what situation would 
cause a complex emotional response (e.g. feigning a positive response to an 
unwanted gift).  These results suggest that adults with ASD learn what complex 
emotional responses are appropriate in different social situations, but find it 
difficult to successfully recognize them.   
An alternative interpretation of our findings is that perhaps people do not 
need to infer the emotion of the person in order to retrodict what happened to 
them. As participants with ASD find the task difficult, perhaps they guess the gift 
and consequently infer a consistent emotion.  The upshot of this critique, termed 
‘Povinelli’s challenge’ (see Perner, 2010; Povinelli and Vonk, 2003), is that it can 
be applied to any task assessing emotion recognition.  Our results also suggest 
that when participants correctly gauge the emotion of the person (e.g. positive) 
they also tended to correctly infer what gift the person received (chocolate).  In 




addition, when participants incorrectly interpreted the emotion of the person 
(e.g. positive, as opposed to confused) they also incorrectly, but consistently 
inferred what gift they received (chocolate, when they really received monopoly 
money).  This association between gift and emotion inferences is unlikely to 
exist if what gift a person received can be inferred by some other means than 
interpreting their emotional response.   
Why were participants with ASD less accurate when interpreting positive 
and feigned positive emotions, but not confused?  Previous research has shown 
that complex mental states such as confused are difficult for people with ASD to 
recognize, particularly from dynamic facial expressions (e.g. Back et al., 2007).  
It could be the case that people with ASD can distinguish very different emotions 
(positive from confused), but have difficulty making more subtle distinctions 
(genuine from feigned positive).  Analysis of participants’ errors suggests that 
this was the case; participants with ASD were significantly more likely to mistake 
feigned positive reactions to the home-made gift as a genuine positive reaction 
to chocolate than typical controls.  However both typical controls and 
participants with ASD did not tend to misinterpret feigned positive reactions to 
the home-made gift as confused reactions to monopoly money or vice-versa.  
Boraston et al. (2008) have presented a similar argument for adults with ASD 
having difficulty making subtle distinctions between genuine and posed smiles, 
which involve attention to subtle cues in the eye region of faces.   
  Can reduced accuracy in the ASD group be explained by reduced 
attention to the eye region of faces?  Baron-Cohen et al. (1991; 2001a) have 
argued that people with ASD have difficulty inferring emotions from the eye 
region of faces, which may be particularly important for recognition of feigned 
positive expressions (Boraston et al., 2008; Ekman and Friesen, 1982; Ekman, 




Friesen and O’Sullivan, 1988; Ekman, Friesen, and Davidson, 1990).  In the 
current study, although participants with ASD spent less time looking to the eye 
region and more to the mouth region than controls, this difference failed to 
reach significance.  Looking to the eyes also did not predict accuracy in either 
group.  These results suggest that other available cues, such as auditory 
information, may be important when judging an individual’s emotional response.  
Evidence of poor emotion recognition in vocalizations has been found in adults 
with ASD (Philip, et al. 2010; Heaton, et al. 2012).  Furthermore, Golan et al. 
(2006) have suggested that individuals with ASD may be more focused on 
speech content, failing to integrate contextual and facial cues, causing adults 
with ASD to misinterpret complex emotions such as sarcasm as genuine 
responses.  In the current study, those with ASD could have focused more on 
speech content (e.g. “thank you”, for chocolate and home-made, versus “OK” for 
monopoly money), whereas typical controls may have integrated speech content 
with tone of voice and facial cues.  This could have resulted in those with ASD 
confusing reactions to chocolate and home-made gifts, but not monopoly 
money.   
Our results demonstrate the impact of emotion recognition difficulties in 
adults with ASD on an important social skill – being able to make sense of 
another person’s behavior.  Adults with ASD have difficulty retrodicting what 
caused an emotional response when this involves recognition of subtle emotion 
responses, requiring integration of cues across different modalities.  These 
results challenge claims that emotion recognition difficulties in ASD are primarily 
due to lack of attention to the eye region of faces, and stress the importance of 
other emotional cues (e.g. auditory, body movement).  Difficulties in retrodictive 
mindreading could impact on the way adults with ASD interact with others in 




everyday life.  Failure to recognise whether someone is genuinely happy or 
trying to put on a brave face could make the difference between mistakenly 
congratulating them on a positive event, or correctly consoling them after a 
disappointing outcome.  Such difficulties in social interaction are a hallmark of 
adults with ASD’s difficulties in everyday life.  Future research should aim to 
elucidate the subtle nature of emotion processing difficulties in adults with ASD 
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  Mean SD Range Mean SD Range  
Age (years) 36.44 12 20-61 30.42 13.49 20-67 
t(33)=1.38, 
p=.18 
Full-Scale IQ 117.06 14.63 91-140 119.95 8.7 105-136 t(33)=.7, p=.5 
Verbal IQ 114 14.63 92-143 114.58 9.64 97-137 t(32)=.13, p=.9 
Performance 
IQ 115.13 14.45 86-138 119.89 8.99 107-136 
t(32)=1.2, 
p=.23 
AQ 37.69 9.46 18-47 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ADOS 9.27 4.13 4-18 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 






































Table 2: Confusion matrices showing frequency of correct and incorrect gift inferences in 
the ASD and typical control group. 
    





 a) Typical Control Group Chocolate 
 
Home-








Chocolate 59 45 29 133 
 Home-
made 31 76 29 
136 
 Monopoly 





Know 0 0 1 
 
1 
Total 133 133 133  
      
















Chocolate 37 50 22 109 
Home-
made 
40 44 27 111 
Monopoly 
Money 
26 14 59 99 
Don’t 
Know 
9 4 4 17 
Total 112 112 112  
 

















Table 3: Frequency of emotion ratings for correct gift inferences in the ASD and typical 
group. 
a) Typical Control 
Group 
    
Correct Gift Response   
(Expected Frequencies in Brackets)   
  Total 
    Chocolate Home-made Monopoly Money   
Emotion Positive 46A (27.1) 42 (34.9) 8 (34) 96 
  Pretend 0 (3.4) 12A (4.4) 0 (4.2) 12 
  Confused 9 (19.5) 10 (25.1) 50A (24.4) 69 




1 (0.6) 1 (0.7) 0 (0.7) 2 
Total 59 76 74 209 
      
b) ASD Group 
    
Correct Gift Response   
(Expected Frequencies in Brackets)   
  Total 
    Chocolate Home-made Monopoly Money   
Emotion Positive 30A (13.2) 20 (15.7) 6 (21) 56 
  Pretend 0 (3.3) 13A (3.9) 1 (5.3) 14 
  Confused 2 (11.1) 7 (13.2) 38A (17.7) 47 




3 (0.9) 0 (1.1) 1 (1.5) 4 
Total 37 44 59 140 
 














Table 4: The frequency of emotion ratings for incorrect gift inferences in the ASD and 
typical group. 
a) Typical Control 
Group 
    
Incorrect Gift Response 
(Expected Frequencies in Brackets) 
  
  Total 








Emotion Positive 61a  (31.5) 13 (25.6) 6 (23.4) 1 (0.4) 81 
  Pretend 0 (2.7) 5a (2.2) 2 (2) 0 (0) 7 
  Confused 9 (21) 21 (17) 24a (15.6) 0 (0.3) 54 




1 (0.4) 0 (0.3) 0 (0.3) 0 (0) 1 
Total 74 60 55 1 190 
      
a) ASD Group 
    
Incorrect Gift Response 
(Expected Frequencies in Brackets) 
  
  Total 








Emotion Positive 63a (33) 16 (30.2) 6 (18.3) 3 (6.4) 88 
  Pretend 0 (6.7) 15a (6.2) 3 (3.7) 0 (1.3) 18 
  Confused 1 (14.6) 24 (13.4) 14a (8.1) 0 (2.8) 39 




7 (8.6) 4 (7.9) 4 (4.8) 8 (1.7) 23 
Total 72 66 40 14 192 
 
























Figure 1: Percentage of correct gift inferences for the typical and autistic group 
for each gift.  The red line denotes chance level (33%). 
 
Figure 2: Example fixation and saccade data over regions of interest (eyes and 
mouth) for a participant with autism (above left) and typical participant (above 
right). 
 
Figure 3: Percentage duration of fixations on the eyes and mouth for each gift. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of fixations on the eyes and mouth for each gift. 
 
Figure 5: Percentage durations of fixations on the eyes and mouth in each 
group. 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of fixations on the eyes and mouth in each group. 
 
 
 
 
 
